I've discovered a new wave of Luddites. Not weavers with sledgehammers, not programmers whining about neural networks taking their jobs. Product managers. Their argument, repeated like a mantra: if vibecoding actually worked, we'd see a colossal boom of new successful commercial IT projects. We don't. Therefore, vibecoding is a marketing bubble. Here is why that conclusion disqualifies them from the job.
You're weighing a new harvest on a dead scale
The absence of a flood of "vibecoded" commercial products doesn't prove the tool is broken. It proves you don't understand the world you're standing in.
The software market didn't change cosmetically. It changed fundamentally at the economic level. That old model — where someone takes a technology, builds a product, launches it "to the market," and makes millions — is gone. Not harder. Gone.
Yet the product manager keeps pressing an old ruler against the new reality. They wait for a "surge in successful small businesses," fail to find it in the old coordinates, and cheerfully declare the technology dead. They measure a new field with a scale that hung in a shop twenty years ago, then blame the field.
When a tired programmer argues this, it's at least understandable — their salary is genuinely threatened. But a product manager? The person whose entire job is to be the first to read where value has shifted and where the money now lives? A product manager who still hasn't grasped that everything shifted? That's not nearsightedness. That's professional disqualification.
Why nobody in their right mind builds a product "for the market"
The economics:
There are no vibecoded commercial products on the market not because they can't be built, but because nobody in their right mind would build them for the market. Launching a new commercial product is now pointless. Any high schooler will re-vibecode it tomorrow evening for free.
And here's the part the Luddite product manager cannot fit into their skull: it does not matter HOW you built it.
Hand-coded by Himalayan virgin programmers or generated by Claude for twenty bucks in one evening — no difference. Whether you hired grey-bearded architects and team leads with thirty years of experience or slapped it together with a single prompt on your knee — no difference. Your expertise, your heroic backlog, your six months of development no longer form a protective moat around the product.
Absolutely no difference.
The barrier to entry used to be time, money, and rare engineers. That barrier was the actual product. You weren't selling a feature; you were selling the fact that replicating it was expensive. Now replication is cheap. Effectively free. Whatever you planned to charge money for on "the market" slips through your fingers the moment you ship it. The product-to-market business model didn't break partially. It zeroed out.
That's exactly why founders are "tinkering in their own corner." It's not a sign that the technology doesn't work. It's the precise behavior the new economy rewards. They aren't idiots. The idiot is the one waiting for the old ritual of "launch to market → collect millions" and, upon not seeing it, declaring the technology dead.
Where vibecoding actually makes money
If the value is no longer in selling software outward, where did it go? Inward.
Vibecoding is a tool for application INSIDE an organization. It doesn't generate market revenue. It carves cost out of your own budget.
First: payroll. A development department that used to require ten people now closes with fewer. This isn't abstract "efficiency" from a slide deck — these are specific lines in a payroll ledger that are no longer mandatory.
Second: license fees. This is less familiar to a Russian eye, where pirating software or enduring inconveniences was the norm. But in the EU and the Emirates, an average company legally pays for software like an adult: dozens of products, licensed per seat, every single month. Multiply that by the headcount. An internal tool, vibecoded for a specific task to replace a paid external product, cuts that subscription out of the budget entirely.
That is where the technology already works and brings money. Not as a storefront on a marketplace, but as a deduction from your own costs. That money simply doesn't exist in the "successful commercial launches" statistics the product manager is staring at. They look in the wrong place, find nothing, and conclude there is nothing to see.
The competence test
So I'll answer the original thesis directly. "We would see a surge in successful small businesses"?
You won't. And you never will — not because vibecoding doesn't work, but because you're looking for its effect where the new economy dictates it cannot exist. Value moved from the external market to the internal perimeter of companies, and public launch statistics simply don't catch it.
The ability to see this shift — where value now arises and why the old product-to-market model is dead — is a baseline competency for a product manager. It is literally what they get paid for.
Hand your product manager the argument about "we'd see a surge in small businesses" and watch what they say. If they nod and agree that a lack of public launches means the technology is a dud, you know exactly who to replace.

